التحول الى الشمولية في صنع القرار الصيني: الدوافع والمآلات

Section: Articles
Published
Jun 1, 2026
Pages
155-173

Abstract

 After the death of the leader (Mao Zedong), his successor (Deng Xiaoping) and his colleagues sought to prevent excessive concentration of power, by establishing fixed and specific conditions for positions, a mandatory retirement age, delegating power from the CCP to government agencies, holding regular meetings of party institutions, all these measures were designed to decentralize power, organize political life, institutionalize it, followed by their successors (Jiang Zemin) and (Hu Jintao), as the regular succession of leadership before death was a rare achievement in the Chinese Communist system, and the most important source of "authoritarian flexibility". Over the past decade, (Xi) has made extensive efforts to systematically restructure and centralize decision-making processes within the Chinese party state in all policy areas, strengthen the ability of the CCP to control policy-making and expand its power to advance the Chinese policy agenda, as Chinese President (Xi) is working to return China to the stage of personal leadership after decades of institutional collective leadership; while avoiding what he considers shortcomings in the leadership of his predecessors, however, Xi's centralization of decision-making power may reduce the ability to adapt to lower-level local governments, encourage the adoption of the CCP on certain political approaches to meet China's structural challenges, and if these trends continue, China may put itself in front of a complex set of challenges that force the United States to make difficult-to-predict political and economic decisions, a more assertive foreign policy, and a more aggressive military posture.

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